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Abstract 
This paper analyzes an Easley and O'Hara (1992) type sequential trading model in an evolutionary setting. We assume 
that the memory of a market maker is limited, and that traders endogenously choose whether to acquire private 
information with a fixed cost. We show that the ratio of the informed traders is proportional to the width of the bid ask 
spread, and that the price converges to the strong-form efficient level exponentially.
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     1 Introduction
Easley and O￿ Hara (1992) show how trading volume a⁄ects the speed of
price adjustment in a market with asymmetric information. They have the
following setting. A group of informed traders is ￿xed and they have identical
private information about the value of the asset. Other traders do not have
such private information. At each time, a randomly chosen trader can place
one unit of sell or buy order. A market maker determines the price without
knowing whether the trader has the private information or not. The market
maker learns the traders￿private information from the trading history, so
that the bid-ask spread (resp. the price) converges to zero (the strong-form
e¢ cient level1) exponentially over time.
They assume that the ratio of informed traders is ￿xed at some constant ￿
over time. However this assumption may be a simplifying assumption. Since
each trader who comes to the market and trades at most once in sequence has
the ￿xed amount of information, it might sound obvious that the price factors
in the information at a rapid rate. Then we will consider the model where
there are tangible and intangible costs to receive information, and where
each trader decides whether to receive the information. Once we consider
the cost, it is not apparent whether the price converges to the strong-form
e¢ cient level. When a chosen trader knows that the price enough re￿ ects
the information, he may not be willing to pay for the private information,
which may not result in the exponential convergence shown in their paper.
Our model is not a straightforward extension of their model. To simplify
the analysis, we change the setting by assuming that traders￿memories are
limited. This dynmic is a Markov process. We assume that the intraday
trading volume is high enough, so that most of trading are done under the
stationary state of this Markov process. ￿ is ￿xed throughout the day. Our
model repeats these kinds of intraday trading. After the trading hour, small
minority of the trader can review their choices whether to pay for the in-
formation. They are prepared for the trade in the stationary state under ￿
observed on the adjacent trade. New ￿ is determined by their choice changes,
a number of trades under new ￿ on the next day leads to a new stationary
state, and there are review of choices after trading hours... Through this
process, ￿ should come to the level where there is no di⁄erence between pay-
1In the sense of their model, this term means that the price fully re￿ ects the informed
traders￿information.
1ing for the information and not paying. We will see the behavior of prices in
the place where it settles down as the memory of the market maker becomes
in￿nite.
We obtain the result in which the ratio of the informed traders is pro-
portional to the width of the bid ask spread, and the price converges to the
strong-form e¢ cient level exponentially as is shown in Easley and O￿ Hara
(1992).
2 Model
We consider an intraday transaction. The value of the asset at the end
of the day is represented by a random variable V . Before the start of the
trading day, an information event that relates to the asset value occurs with
the probability ￿, where 0 < ￿ < 1. If the information event occurs, the
fraction ￿ of the traders can know the occurrence of the information event,
and observe an identical signal. We require that 0 < ￿ < 1. The other
1 ￿ ￿ traders and the market maker do not observe it. Formally, we de￿ne
an information event as the occurrence of a signal ￿ about V . The signal
can take one of two values, L and H, with probabilities ￿ > 0 and 1 ￿ ￿ > 0
respectively. We let the expected value of the asset conditional on the signal
be E [V j￿ = L] = V or E [V j￿ = H] = V . If no information event has
occurred, we denote this as ￿ = 0 and the expected value of the asset simply
remains at its unconditional level V ￿ = ￿V + (1 ￿ ￿)V .
The market maker sets the bid and ask prices. Then a randomly chosen
trader comes to the market and places one unit of sell or buy order one by
one.
Each informed trader is risk-neutral and take prices as given. She will
buy if she has seen a high signal and an ask price below V ; she will sell if
she has seen a low signal and a bid price above V .
An trade for liquidity reasons such as the timing of consumption or port-
folio considerations may arise. She will buy (resp. sell) with the constant




. If it is not the case, she does not want to trade,
because the quotes should be unpro￿table for her.
We assume that the market maker is risk-neutral and behaves competi-
tively. That is, his price quotes yield zero expected pro￿t conditional on a
trade at the quotes and on the past trading information in the memory.
This trading structure can be understood more easily by the tree diagram
2given in Figure 1.
Figure 1
At the ￿rst node nature selects whether the information event occurs.
If there is an information event, then the type of signal (either L or H)
is determined at the second node. These two nodes are reached once and
for all at the beginning of the day. Traders are selected at each time t to
trade based on the probabilities described above. Thus, if an information
event has occurred, an informed trader is selected with probability ￿, and
she then chooses either to buy or sell. Similarly, with probability 1 ￿ ￿ an
uninformed trader is selected and she may choose to buy, sell or not trade
with the indicated probabilities. For trade in the next time interval, only the
3process at the right part of dotted line on the tree diagram is repeated. This
continues throughout the day.
The market maker is Bayesian who has limited memory. He does not
know whether the information event has occurred, whether it is good or bad
news given that it has occurred, or whether any particular trader is informed.
Over time, the traders￿orders allow the market maker to learn whether the
information event has occurred and whether it is good or bad news given
that it has occurred and revise his belief. But he cannot remember all past
trades. He remembers only m outcomes of the past trading. That is, he
remembers the number of the buy orders ￿, sell orders s, and no trade n
(￿ + s + n ￿ m) in the past trades. Note that the quotes submitted by the
market maker depend not on the entire history but only on the ratios of
the number of each order (See Proposition 3 in Easley and O￿ Hara (1992)).
He can remember all the past trades before the time m. At t (t > m), he
randomly forgets one of m outcomes in his memory at t ￿ 1 with equal
probabilities, and remembers the new outcome at t.2
With a calculation similar to the one in Easley and O￿ Hara (1992), the
market maker￿ s beliefs given his memory are given by:
Prf￿ = 0j(n;s;￿)g
=
Prf￿ = 0; (n;s;￿)g
Prf￿ = 0; (n;s;￿)g + Prf￿ = L; (n;s;￿)g + Prf￿ = H; (n;s;￿)g
























￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
B￿￿
]g:
The probabilities of low and high signals are calculated similarly.
Since beliefs depend on (n;s;￿), quotes will also depend on these vari-
ables. The bid b and the ask a can be written as:
b = Prf￿ = Lj(n;s + 1;￿)gV
+ Prf￿ = Hj(n;s + 1;￿)gV + Prf￿ = 0j(n;s + 1;￿)gV
￿; and
a = Prf￿ = Lj(n;s;￿ + 1)gV
+ Prf￿ = Hj(n;s;￿ + 1)gV + Prf￿ = 0j(n;s;￿ + 1)gV
￿:
2He is not aware that he will forget one outcome. When he set the quotes, he considers
the m + 1 trade (m past outcomes and a potential sell/buy/no-trade order at the present
time) as is noted below.
4We de￿ne the collection ￿; n;s, and ￿ as a state. We can calculate the
transition probabilities between all pairs of the states, and regard the process
as Markov process. This process is not irreducible. For example, (L;￿;￿;￿) is





While there are in￿nite number of stationary distributions in this Markov
process, the ratios of stationary distribution probability pairs of states are
the same as the corresponding ones that have the same ￿. That is, there is a
degree of freedom of how to distribute gross probabilities to three absorbing
states, but the allocation of the distributed probability in each absorbing set
is unique. Formally, when we ￿x an outcome of ￿ = L; H, or 0 arbitrary,
the ￿partial processes,￿in which the sets of states consist of n + s + ￿ = m;
are ￿nite, irreducible, and recurrent. Therefore each partial process has a
unique stationary distribution. Multiplying these stationary distributions
given ￿ by the probabilities of ￿ occurring, the distribution of the convex
combination of them is also stationary, which we call stationary state.
3 Stationary State
In this section, we solve the stationary state analytically.













￿ if ￿ = L




￿ if ￿ = H, and




￿ if ￿ = 0;
where
pn (￿) = PrfNo Tradej￿g;
ps (￿) = PrfSellj￿g; and









x(￿;n;s;￿) = ￿￿ (pn (L) + ps (L) + p￿ (L))
3
+ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(pn (H) + ps (H) + p￿ (H))
3
+ (1 ￿ ￿)(pn (0) + ps (0) + p￿ (0))
3
= 1:
The transition probabilities in both the entire process and the partial processes
are


































Prf(￿;n;s;￿) ! othersg = 0:










































































































4 Evolutionary Decision Making on Free En-
try
We now modify the setting of the model. We repeat the intraday trading
analyzed above again and again. We assume that the traders can choose to
receive the information by bearing cost. The ratio of traders who can receive
the information is ￿ at the initial day. Every day one trader is randomly cho-
sen before the trading, and she can decide whether to receive the information
with the cost c > 0. She expects that the present state is the stationary state
7on that occasion. If she chooses to receive information (resp. does not re-
ceive information), the value of ￿ becomes greater (less) than now in a small
range. If she chooses to receive the information, and if the information event
occurs, then she can receive the information. Otherwise she behave as an
uninformed trader. Other traders do not change their information acquisi-
tion behaviors on this day. Now we can calculate the stationary state under
the new ￿ and the trading converges to the stationary state. On the next
day, another trader is randomly chosen in the new stationary state, and she
makes the same decision... We call the state where the trader is indi⁄erent
between acquiring and not acquiring the information as a stable state.
The following scenario may facilitate the readers￿understandings. The
traders often get up late. The market has already opened, and there are
too many trades for the market maker to remember because of his limited
memory m. The state in the market seems to have converged to the sta-
tionary state. The proportion ￿ of the traders subscribe the newspapers,
and can read them before they trade. Since they get up now, they do not
know if important events occurred today until they read the newspaper. The
market maker is busy and has no time to read the newspaper. The fee of
subscription is c. After reading the newspaper, she can place her order once
in order to maximize her today￿ s payo⁄. Even if she can not receive the
information and if she does not want to trade, she may have to buy or sell
with the probabilities ￿B or ￿S. A newspaper gentry goes door-to-door and
solicits subscriptions at a pace of a house a day (probably after the trading
hours). When the newspaper gentry comes, a trader can choose whether she
enters her subscription, renews, or cancels. The market maker knows how
many people read the newspapers.
What is a stable state in such a dynamic? When the number of traders
who read the newspapers is small (resp. large), it is di¢ cult (easy) for the
market maker to learn through the outcomes, the price re￿ ects the informa-
tion less (more), and the value of reading the newspaper is large (small),
which results in the increase (decrease) of the willingness for the traders to
read the newspapers. Reading and not reading must be indi⁄erent in the
stable state.
We can think of the bid-ask spread as an indicator of information e¢ -
ciency. We see the relationship between the bid-ask spread and the memory
length of the market maker. Now we can prove that the average value of the
bid-ask spread is proportional to ￿ in the stable state.
8Proposition 2 Suppose that ￿S = ￿B. Then, in the stable state the following
holds: X
x(￿;n;s;￿) (a ￿ b) =
￿
￿Sc;
where a ￿ b is the bid-ask spread when the memories are (n;s;￿).
Proof. Denote the expected payo⁄ of the trader paying c as X, and not
paying as Y . Since the expected payo⁄ of the market maker is zero,
￿X + (1 ￿ ￿)Y = 0:
On the other hand, there is no di⁄erence between paying and not paying for
the trader,
X ￿ c = Y:
Therefore
￿c = ￿Y:
Since the bid-ask spread depends on ￿, it is di¢ cult to express it as
a function of ￿ explicitly. In order to understand the behavior of ￿, we
give simple numerical examples in what follows. The ￿gure below shows
the relationship between m and ￿ in the stable states in the case where
V = 100; V = 0; ￿ = 0:7; 0:8; 0:9; ￿S = ￿B = 0:05, and c = 1. ￿ and the
average value of the bid-ask spread decrease exponentially with the capacity
of memory m. Thus, we show that the prices converge to the strong form
e¢ cient level of the price exponentially over time (as is shown in Easley and
O￿ Hara (1992)) in the model in which the traders can choose whether they
9receive the private information or not.
Figure 2
Intuitively, as m becomes greater, the market maker can learn more from
the past trade ￿ ow, and the asymmetric information is eased. He narrows
down bid-ask spreads since the loss by the trade with informed traders is
less. Since the information is conveyed through prices, the traders become
less willing to receive the information. Even if they may have to trade for
liquidity reasons, the loss is not large so much because the price is almost
strong form e¢ cient. The above result holds with various parameters.
The ration ￿ of information acquisition when ￿ = 0:9 is lower than when
￿ = 0:7, in case of memory m is short. This might be against our intuition
and debatable. For example, we can interpret in the following manner: If
￿ is pretty close to 1, it is sure that traders can acquire the information
almost certainly. However, the market maker knows this fact, and would
set the bid-ask spread to a substantially wide level, corresponding to high
￿, so that the payo⁄ of a informed trader comes to be small. That is, the
10bene￿t to get the information is relatively less than the cost, and the traders
have a little incentive of information acquisition. When m is longer, the
market maker gives greater importance to the past trade on the decision
making of the spread. The greater ￿ is, the more the information acquisition
is, which is consistent with our intuition.3 Other comparative statics are
intuitive, including that ￿ is uniformly greater if information acquisition cost
c is smaller.
5 Conclusion
We analyze the model in which the traders can choose either to receive private
information or not when the capacity of memory of the market maker is
limited. We obtain the result that the prices exponentially converge to the
strong-form e¢ cient level.
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